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Abstract
This paper formulates a new task of extracting privacy parameters from a privacy policy, through
the lens of Contextual Integrity, an established social theory framework for reasoning about pri-
vacy norms. Privacy policies, written by lawyers, are lengthy and often comprise incomplete
and vague statements. In this paper, we show that traditional NLP tasks, including the recently
proposed Question-Answering based solutions, are insufficient to address the privacy parame-
ter extraction problem and provide poor precision and recall. We describe 4 different types of
conventional methods that can be partially adapted to address the parameter extraction task with
varying degrees of success: Hidden Markov Models, BERT fine-tuned models, Dependency Type
Parsing (DP) and Semantic Role Labeling (SRL). Based on a detailed evaluation across 36 real-
world privacy policies of major enterprises, we demonstrate that a solution combining syntactic
DP coupled with type-specific SRL tasks provides the highest accuracy for retrieving contextual
privacy parameters from privacy statements. We also observe that incorporating domain-specific
knowledge is critical to achieving high precision and recall, thus inspiring new NLP research to
address this important problem in the privacy domain.
1 Introduction
A privacy policy informs users about a company’s information handling practices. However, privacy
policies are lengthy documents, full of incomplete and vague statements that impose a significant cog-
nitive burden on the reader to infer whether a given service respects their privacy (Bhatia et al., 2016a;
Bhatia and Breaux, 2018; Reidenberg et al., 2015).
This challenge has inspired many recent works in applying natural language processing and machine
learning techniques to automatically process privacy policies and retrieve the relevant information (Hark-
ous et al., 2018; Ravichander et al., 2019). While these efforts help in identifying paragraphs in the
privacy policy that mention sensitive information (Evans et al., 2017; Bhatia and Breaux, 2015), opt-out
clauses (Sathyendra et al., 2016) or description of data collection practice (Sadeh et al., 2014), they focus
on the policy as a whole rather than the individual privacy statements that it contains. In particular, they
do not aim to identify relevant and often missing contextual information that are critical for unambigu-
ously understanding the scope of individual statements. This paper focuses on a new NLP task that aids
the analysis of privacy policies at this more fine-grained level.
To illustrate the problem, consider a typical example of an ambiguous privacy statement: “Yahoo col-
lects information about your transactions with us and with some of our business partners, including
information about your use of financial products and services that we offer.” At first glance, the state-
ment may seem to provide all the relevant information about a first-party collection of transactional data.
However, it in fact misses some crucial contextual information. To understand what is missing, we use
the contextual integrity (CI) framework (Nissenbaum, 2009). CI defines privacy as an appropriate flow
of information which is expressed in terms of 5 essential CI parameters: Sender, Recipient, Subject, In-
formation Type, and Transmission Principle. The latter is a constraint on the information flow expressing
the condition under which information is being transferred. The above statement specifies only 3 out of
the 5 necessary parameters (highlighted in bold) – Subject, Recipient and Information Type. This leaves
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the sender of the information and transmission principle to the reader’s interpretation. In some cases, the
relevant missing information appears in different places in the policy, for example, under different sec-
tions such as “When do we collect your information” or “Our partners”. These, however, do not help in
contextually positioning the above statement so that the reader can determine whether their expectations
have been met.
In this paper, we formulate the new NLP task of extracting the CI parameters from privacy statements
(§ 3). We describe four different types of conventional methods that have been partially adapted to
address this task: Hidden Markov Models, BERT models, Dependency-Type Parsing and CI specific
Semantic Role Labeling (§ 4). Our evaluation of 36 real-world privacy policies shows that a solution
combining syntactic dependency type parsing (DP) coupled with type-specific Semantic Role Labeling
(SRL) tasks provides the highest accuracy for retrieving contextual privacy parameters from privacy
statements (§ 5). We also observe that incorporating domain-specific knowledge is critical and doing so,
we successfully extract the relevant CI parameters with F1 score of 80% or higher.
2 Related Work
Several recent efforts have focused on identifying important and relevant privacy statements using con-
stituency parsing (Sathyendra et al., 2017; Sathyendra et al., 2016; Evans et al., 2017), logistic regression
(Ammar et al., 2012) and crowdsourcing (Wilson et al., 2016b) techniques. Harkous et al. (2018) trained
a machine learning model for querying privacy policies to retrieve relevant passages of information.
Specifically, it supports free form questions about data handling practices described in the text and re-
turns the paragraph mentioning the relevant practice. As we discuss in Section 3, our work explicitly
looks to map the privacy statement to a fixed set of parameters. We also show that Question Answering
(QA) models do not perform satisfactorily when applied to our task.
Similar limitations of the reading comprehension models were observed by Ravichander et al. (2019),
who composed the PRIVACYQA dataset, an annotated corpus consisting of 1750 questions about the
contents of privacy policies such as “What data does this game collect?” and “Will my data be sold to
advertisers?”. Our work is inspired by these efforts to provide a dataset of CI parameter annotations and
a machine learning model for automatic CI parameter extraction.
In prior work on automatic privacy statement analysis, Bhatia et al. (2016b) extracted privacy state-
ments on information handling practice such as “collecting your e-mail address” or “sharing your loca-
tion” using typed dependency parser and crowdworker annotations. More relevant to our efforts, Bhatia
and Breaux (2018) applied Semantic Roles theory to manually annotate 5 privacy statements and identify
action verbs (action data) such as “collection”, “retain”, “use”, “transfer” and associated semantic roles
that capture who performs the action, how the action is carried out, etc.
Shvartzshnaider et al. (2019a) crowdsourced privacy policies annotation to compare policy versions,
identifying missing contextual information and overloading of parameters that contribute to users’ in-
ability to understand the prescribed information practices. Our work automates the task of annotating
privacy policies with the CI parameters.
Many other multidisciplinary efforts draw on CI, as the underpinning privacy theory and can benefit
from our newly formulated annotation task. Legal scholars and social scientists have used CI to examine
existing data sharing practices in companies like Facebook (Hull et al., 2011) and Google (Zimmer,
2008) in order to identify important contextual elements behind users’ privacy expectations (Apthorpe et
al., 2018; Martin and Nissenbaum, 2016). In computer science, researchers have used CI to build privacy
compliance and verification tools (Barth et al., 2006; Chowdhury et al., 2013).
3 CI Parameters Extraction Task
In this section we formulate the task of extracting relevant CI parameters from privacy policy statements.
Let us first motivate this task by discussing its applications. To perform an analysis of privacy impli-
cations of a given information flow, the theory of CI requires identifying 5 essential parameters: actors
(sender, receiver, subject), the type of information (attribute), and condition of the information exchange
(transmission principle). This analysis can help in identifying potentially confusing or misleading state-
ments, e.g., when one of the five parameters such as transmission principle or receiver is missing or am-
biguous (Shvartzshnaider et al., 2019a). Furthermore, one can use the identified parameters to formalize
the expressed informational norms and privacy rules in formal logic (Shvartzshnaider et al., 2019b; Datta
et al., 2011). These formalisms can in turn be used to build systems that enforce the specified rules or
automatically audit information flows to detect rule violations.
The CI parameter extraction task is as follows. Given a privacy statement stmt, apply a mapping
function M to extract the CI parameters: sender, receiver, subject, attribute, transmission principle:
M(stmt) = (s, r, sub, att, tp)
The main challenge behind the task is in identifying the lexical items in the statement that correspond
to the contextually relevant values to help downstream NLP tasks perform the privacy analysis. This is
not a trivial task as privacy policies are not written with CI in mind. Often, they are written by legal and
policy teams whose primary concern is not readability. Many privacy statements are missing essential
CI parameters and often comprise syntactically complex sentences (Bhatia and Breaux, 2018). In the
absence of an automatic way to extract CI parameters, researchers have employed crowd-sourcing and
manual annotation to perform the analysis (Shvartzshnaider et al., 2019a). The results, while promising,
are not yet satisfactory and have many challenges. We provide a motivating example to demonstrate the
challenges involved in this task. Consider the privacy statement:
We transfer information about you if Yahoo is acquired by or merged with another company.
Sender Attribute Subject TP
Viewed through the lens of CI, we are interested in answering the following questions: “Who is transfer-
ring?”, “What is being transferred?”, “Who is the subject?”, “Who is the receiver/recipient?”, “Why,
When and How is the transfer facilitated?”. The relevant CI parameters are marked in the statement men-
tioned above. We tried applying an open domain QA model to answer these questions. Table 1 shows
results of our expeditionary experiment. The overall F1 scores for the QA model indicates poor results
for extraction of all CI parameters. Note in our experiment, QA outputs multiple phrase predictions for
each of the parameters. For precision, we calculate true positives as a fraction of all positives predicted
for each parameter. For recall, we calculate the fraction of true positives to all correct parameters.
Recall Precision F1
Attribute 0.21 0.14 0.17
Receiver 0.07 0.06 0.06
Sender 0.03 0.02 0.03
Subject 0.06 0.02 0.03
TP 0.21 0.16 0.18
Table 1: Precision, Recall and overall F1 score for QA Comprehension model used for the CI parameter
extraction task. The recall and precision values for a parameter are calculated by macro averaging over
privacy statements.
This result aligns with previous uses of QA in the privacy domain. Ravichander et al. (2019) observed
that, compared to a human annotator, Question Answering for Privacy Policies using standard reading
comprehension models returns relatively poor results in answering specific questions such as “will my
data be sold to advertisers?” and “what data does this [service] collect?”.
These experiences suggest that QA models require additional heuristics to filter the many false pos-
itives as a result of them operating on a paragraph level and not on sentence level statements. Thus,
we have established that extracting CI parameters using existing off-the-shelf models without significant
re-mapping leads to low precision and recall.
Figure 1: CI Parameters annotation task pipeline
In the next section, we discuss how we can re-purpose existing tasks by leveraging domain expertise
in CI to extract these parameters. We further demonstrate that, with a comparable dataset, training an
end-to-end supervised learning model does not provide accurate results.
4 Methods
In this section we describe the NLP methods we applied to the CI parameter extraction task: Hidden
Markov Model, BERT, Dependency Parser (DP) and Semantic Role Labeling (SRL). We illustrate the
post-processing and the modifications required in off-the-shelf end-to-end neural models to extract CI
parameters from privacy policies. Specifically, we focus on Syntactic DP and SRL-based approaches.
4.1 Hidden Markov Model
We formulate the CI parameter extraction as a part-of-speech (POS) tagging task and use a Hidden
Markov Model (HMM) probabilistic model (Jurafsky and Martin, 2014) for annotating words in a sen-
tence. Specifically, we train a trigram HMM by converting the dataset to CoNLL-2003 format (Sang
and De Meulder, 2003) with CI parameters as the target labels. In our setup, we use 80/20 train-test
split, with a training set comprising of 2504 privacy statements and 18533 tokens and a validation set
consisting of 626 privacy statements and 5130 tokens. By default, HMM relies on the Markov assump-
tion that the probability of a particular state only depends on the preceding state. However, in order to
enrich our HMM model, we consider the two previous states when predicting the current CI parameter,
turning it into a trigram model. Further, we obtain the final transition probability distribution by linearly
combining unigram, bigram and trigram probability distributions:
P (ti | ti−1, ti−2) = λ1P (ti | ti−1, ti−2) + λ2P (ti | ti−1) + (1− λ1 − λ2)P (ti)
The parameters λ1 and λ2 are fine-tuned on the validation set with values 0.42 and 0.48 providing the
best results. The Viterbi algorithm (Forney, 1973) is used in the decoding phase for the extended model.
4.2 Bidirectional Encoder Representations from Transformers (BERT)
We frame the CI parameter extraction task as a sequence-to-sequence transformation problem to fine-
tune an advanced BERT model (Devlin et al., 2018) on our dataset to map a sequence of words in
privacy statements to a corresponding sequence of CI tags. For training and testing, we transformed our
dataset into the CoNLL2003 format and used AllenNLP (Gardner et al., 2018) with the train-test split
ratio as 80/20 and values of hyperparameters taken from (Gardner et al., 2017).
Figure 2: Distribution of True Positives and False
Positives for each SRL tag
Figure 3: Distribution of True Positives and False
Positives for each DP tag
4.3 Dependency parsing
Dependency parsing is the task of identifying syntactic roles or dependency types for each of the words
in a sentence. This involves parsing a sentence and identifying the syntactic structure denoting the
grammatical rules that governs a language. Not all the dependency types identified for the English
language are relevant in our study.
We use the DP outputs to identify the relevant CI parameters in the privacy statement. To identify CI
parameters at a single sentence level using local relationships, we run a typed dependency parser (DP)
on the text of the policies. We accept paragraphs as input, split them into sentences and parse each
sentence using the Spacy I/O1 dependency parser. The library (Honnibal and Montani, 2018) achieves
near state-of-the-art performance on most NLP tasks2. We then map the dependency types to specific CI
parameters as shown in Table 2.
CI Parameter Type Dependency types
Attribute dobj, parataxis, nsubjpass
Sender/Receiver nsubj, pronouns
TP xcomp, ccomp, advcl, oprd
Subject poss, agent
Table 2: Mapping of dependency types corresponding to CI parameters. To represent dependencies we
use the Stanford Typed Dependency Manual (De Marneffe and Manning, 2011) notations.
For example, for the following statement from the Google privacy policy, the DP praser will return the
following dependency type tags (white nodes), which are mapped to corresponding CI parameter (gray
nodes):
When you use Google services, we may collect and process information about your actual location.
advcl
TP
pron
Receiver
dobj
Info. type
poss
Subject
Note that, as is evident in Table 2, the dependency types cannot distinguish between the parameter of
sender and receiver. For this, we defer to the task of SRL to identify based on the semantic meaning
of the word. Figure 2 shows the percentage of DP tags that are correctly and incorrectly mapped to the
1https://spacy.io
2https://spacy.io/usage/facts-figures
CI parameters. This indicates the diversity and coverage of the many tags that map to each of the CI
parameters. It also illustrates that the task of extracting CI parameters is not equivalent to that of DP and
new conditional information is required to modify DP and solve the task.
4.4 Semantic Role Labeling
Semantic Role Labeling is the task of mapping words or phrases in a sentence to a semantic role such
as that of an agent, goal, or result (Jurafsky and Martin, 2014). Often, in the classic natural language
processing pipeline, this task is considered to have subsumed syntactic and parts-of-speech tasks within
it (Tenney et al., 2019). For example, the task of distinguishing between a sender and receiver can be
done through SRL, but not through syntactic DP.
Similar to DP, we map the semantic roles to the relevant CI parameters. Table 3 shows the CI
parameter mapping based on a verb’s syntactic arguments. For example the verb “collect” has the
following associated arguments (see PropBank corpus (Martha et al., 2005)): ARG0: agent, entity
acquiring something, ARG1: thing acquired, ARG2: source, ARG3: more specific attribute of ARG1
being collected, ARG4: benefactive.
To recover the predicate argument structure of a sentence we use an AllenNLP implementation of the
Bidirectional LSTM model (He et al., 2017). For example, for the following statement the SRL model
returns:
We collect technical information when you visit our websites
ARG0 V ARG1 ARGM-TMP
or use our mobile applications or services
ARGM-TMP
We then map the arguments onto the CI parameters. In the above example, ARG0 is mapped to Recipient.
ARG1 is an Attribute, and ARGM-TMP is the TP. For each of the verbs these mapping are slightly
different, as shown in Table 3. This mapping, although crude, covers a significant class of privacy policy
statements which describe norms of information flows.
“Sending”
action verbs
“Receiving”
action verbs
Sender ARG2 ARG0
Receiver ARG0 ARG2
Attribute ARG1, C-ARG1
TP ARGM-TMP, ARGM-ADV, ARGM-MNR
ARGM-PNC, ARGM-CAU
Table 3: Mapping semantic roles (notations) to specific CI parameters.
CI-related Semantic Frames The SRL model returns verb-argument predicates for all the identified
verbs in a sentence. Some of these verbs are not relevant to information exchange. For example, in the
above statement, the verb “visits” does not convey semantically meaningful information regarding the
exchange of technical information.
To reduce the number of false positives, we provide a list of verbs to the algorithm which highly
correlate with information exchanges. It is helpful to think of this approach through the lens of the
linguistic theory of Frame semantics (Fillmore and others, 1976), which posits that specific meaning of
words (frame elements) can be understood only as part of a particular context (semantic frames). In our
approach, we would invoke CI-related semantic frames. Specifically, we look for SRL-predicates that
are associated with any transfer of information (actual or perceived). This includes a list of verbs such
as “sending”, “sharing”, “transmitting” and others. In addition to invoking a general semantic frame,
we differentiate between different roles of associated argument with each predicate. In particular, for
predicates like “sending”, “sharing”, “transmitting” the ARG2 is typically associated with the agent role
of a “sender”, the ARG1 captures what was “sent” and ARG0 is associated with the receiving agent
role. For verbs like “gather”, “collect”, “receive”, “acquire” the roles are reversed: ARG0 is typically
associated with a “sending” agent role, the ARG1 describes what is “Received”, and ARG2 is associated
with the “receiving” agent role. Grouping the verbs signifying a “sending” or a “receiving” action helps
us map the corresponding arguments to the relevant CI parameters for Senders and Receivers. The
mapping for TP and Attribute remains the same for all verbs. Finally, our SRL mapping does not include
a semantic role mapping of the Subject parameter. We operate on the assumption that the subject in most
statements is the user.
4.4.1 Clues from CI to Improve SRL
Identifying the arguments for all verbs in the privacy statement results in high recall numbers. Never-
theless, the precision suffers because not all of the verbs need to be invoked. To reduce the number of
false positive mappings, we implement an algorithm which analyzes all the relevant SRL verbs to check
whether any of them appear as part of the Transmission Principle (TP) relative to another verb.
For example, in the following statement the SRL model will pick up two predicates (verbs) and corre-
sponding arguments:
collect: We collect your personal information
ARG0 V ARG1
when you are sharing your post.
ARGM-TMP
sharing: We collect your personal information
when you are sharing your post.
ARGM-TMP ARG0 V ARG1
These arguments will be mapped to CI parameters, as described in the previous section. The verb “share”
is redundant in this context since it is part of the TP of the verb “collect.” Once we identify the redundant
verb, we ignore all arguments associated with it, i.e., our algorithm does not consider these results. We
do keep those parameters that overlap with the parameters produced by non-redundant verbs. For in-
stance, in our example we ignore the verb “share” and the associated with it arguments. Specifically, the
[ARG0: you] and the [ARG1: your post] which otherwise will be mapped to a CI sender and attribute
parameters, respectively.
5 Evaluation
We perform automatic annotation of 36 policies of the OPP-115 Corpus (Wilson et al., 2016a). The
corpus’ privacy policies were annotated to specify data practices mentioned in each of the segments of the
policy. We limit our CI parameter extraction to labeled segments of the policy that discuss information
exchanges such as segments labeled as “First Party Collection/Use”, “Third party sharing/collection”,
“Data Retention”. Following the steps in Figure 1, each segment was split into separate sentences which
were annotated by the respective models. The results were presented to a human annotator, one of the
authors who is an expert on CI. The expert then marked the valid results for each of the privacy statement
sentences and CI parameters, and also provided the ground truth. A sentence was marked as a valid flow
if it prescribed an information exchange of any kind. Otherwise, by default, all sentences are considered
invalid.
Overall, the extraction phase resulted in a total of 2268 privacy statement sentences, out of which 778
were labeled as valid, containing 3245 CI parameters. On average, a policy contains 18 valid statements,
with outliers of 4 and 43 valid statements.
5.1 HMM and BERT models
Table 4 shows the results of training a trigram Hidden Markov Model and a fully-supervised BERT.
Both models perform relatively poorly for our task, especially when it comes to the “Sender” parameter.
HMM’s overall F1 scores are slightly better for detecting other parameters, with the highest F1 score
achieved for the TP parameter in both models.
Recall Precision F1
CI Param. HMM BERT HMM BERT HMM BERT
Attribute 0.65 0.59 0.59 0.43 0.62 0.50
Receiver 0.41 0.52 0.50 0.32 0.45 0.39
Sender 0.06 0.13 0.16 0.14 0.09 0.13
TP 0.81 0.78 0.66 0.58 0.73 0.67
Table 4: F1 Scores for fully-supervised HMM and fine-tuned BERT model. The recall and precision
values are calculated on word level over the whole test set.
5.2 DP and SRL
Table 5 shows precision and recall for both DP and SRL models3. Both models have high recall numbers.
However, in DP the precision is low, indicating that while DP is able to identify all the relevant instances,
it also produces many false positives. SRL performs better, both in terms of precision and recall. The
recall numbers are slightly higher compared to DP and the precision is much higher. We, however, note
that SRL did not process 26 statements. They contain verbs that our algorithm didn’t track, some of
which are not always associated with information exchange, like “sell” and “rent”. Figure 3 shows the
percentage of SRL arguments that are correctly and incorrectly mapped to the CI parameters. Note that,
compared to the dependency tags from DP, semantic arguments from SRL result in more valid mappings
to CI parameters.
5.2.1 Improved SRL
Table 5 shows the results for improved SRL after applying our algorithm incorporating domain-specific
heuristics. The precision results have improved across all the parameters, affecting recall only slightly.
We note that our F1 metric is calculated on phrase prediction level.
Recall Precision F1
Model CI
Param.
DP Attribute 0.68 0.43 0.53
Subject 0.79 0.26 0.40
TP 0.76 0.62 0.68
SRL Attribute 0.93 0.72 0.81
Receiver 0.94 0.75 0.83
Sender 0.95 0.64 0.76
TP 0.91 0.71 0.80
CI-SRL Attribute 0.91 0.77 0.83
Receiver 0.88 0.79 0.84
Sender 0.91 0.74 0.82
TP 0.90 0.84 0.87
Table 5: F1 Scores for all the models: DP, SRL and Improved SRL (CI-SRL). The recall and precision
values for each parameter are calculated by macro averaging over privacy statements.
Performance across Policies: Figure 4 shows F1 score distributions for the annotated policies. The
majority of policies (26) have F1 scores in the range of 80-90, which is consistent with the average F1
scores per parameter. A couple of policies perform much better giving a high F1 value of more than 90,
whereas some (6) fall in the first group with F1 scores in the range of 70-79 with 5 out of the 8 policies
in the 75-79 F1 range.
3Specifically we used AllenNLP (0.8.5) with Bert SRL (Bert-base-SRL-2019.06.17) model.
Figure 4: Histogram of F1 scores across privacy policies
Analysis of Low Precision Statements: We analyzed the privacy statements for which our heuristic
algorithm achieved low precision scores to better understand the reasons behind the poor performance.
The statements where the SRL-based algorithm performed especially poorly involved semantically com-
plex or long connected sentences. Semantically complex statements comprise multiple verb-predicates
with related arguments that result in a large number of false positives. For example:
SCEA’s consumer services department maintains information obtained from consumers who contact or
submit an online complaint so that we may assist these customers with current or future service issues.
sensitive personal information
.
Long connected sentences comprise several phrases. However, due to improper punctuation they appear
as a single sentence to our algorithm and as a result generate a large number of false positives. For
example, the following statement comprises multiple sentences that are connected with a colon:
There are two main types of information we collect about users of our online services that include (but are
not limited to) the following: Information that identifies you: This is commonly referred to as “personal
information” and includes, for example, information that you provide to us such as your name, home
address, age, gender, telephone number, e-mail address, payment information (including your credit card
number), and/or photos or video footage of you; and & Information that relates to you, but on its own
does not identify you: Such as information about your Internet connection, the equipment you use to
access our online services and information relating to your usage of those services.
These cases are not only problematic for an NLP task but also require significant cognitive effort for a
human attempting to analyze the privacy implications of the prescribed information flows. Rather than
adapting our method to yield better results in these cases, it might be best to use it to detect these complex
sentences so that they can be restated more clearly.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we formulate a new CI parameter extraction NLP task for analysis of privacy statements.
We adapt several conventional NLP and ML methods (HMM, BERT, DP and SRL) to perform the task
and demonstrate that it cannot be solved trivially. In our evaluation of privacy statements from 36 real-
world privacy policies, we show that a method combining clues from CI into syntactic DP coupled with
type-specific SRL obtains the highest F1 score. We build on this insight to devise an algorithm that
incorporates domain-specific knowledge to achieve a much higher precision and recall. The proposed
algorithm post-processes ML outputs and increases automation of a tedious task that has so far been
performed manually. Further improvements of this task, leveraging domain knowledge for complex
scenarios will directly benefit downstream applications ranging from aiding the design and analysis of
privacy policies to building systems that meet users’ privacy expectations by construction.
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